From charred Atlanta marching, they launched the sword again.

“The March to the Sea” by Herman Melville (December 1864)

It was a cold late fall day in 1864 as Sarah Barber Wiggins stood on her front porch and stared toward the road only 200 yards away. She strained to hear the imagined, distance sound of horse hooves and soldiers’ boots striking the ground.  Sarah cast her gaze over the tops of the tall Georgia pines hoping to catch a glimpse of the dust cloud that was sure to be rising from pounding of shoe leather and horse shoe iron against the dry, sandy loom soil of the Emanuel County roads. She knew they were coming and she now knew what she had to do. The matriarch of the Wiggins family swore silently before God to do whatever necessary to preserve her family and farm. George, her oldest son at 14, stood beside her with a tight grip on his father’s double barrel shotgun.  Since his father left to join the Confederate Army more than two years earlier, George had taken on the role as the man of the house and protector of the family.  Now, as the marauding army approached, he was bound and determined that no Yankee soldier would set foot near the Wiggins “plantation” as his mother like to refer to their 700 acre farm just a few miles south of Summerville. In the coming days, George’s bravado would fade away just like the Confederate army before Sherman’s marching horde. Indeed, there were difficult days were just ahead for all of the Wiggins clan.

It is difficult to be sure that this is an accurate opening paragraph story of the Wiggins family as it relates to the events of late November 1864 and early December 1864. There are many uncertainties in this intriguing story, but there are also some facts that can be known. One element of the account stands clear, that of one woman’s drive and determination to save family and farm at all costs. Sarah Wiggins was a woman bent on preserving both family and farm. It is undoubtedly possible that the events of these days transpired in a manner similar to the narrative above.

The story of the Wiggins family’s encounter with the army of William T. Sherman is a curious blend of fact and fiction; courage and deceit. On the one hand, the Wiggins family members seem to be the hapless victims of a portion of those 60,000 Federal troops moving rapidly through the Georgia countryside from Atlanta to Savannah. This was a grand army of Union troops sowing a sixty mile wide path of devastation and destruction across the state. The Wiggins’ family and farm were simply caught in the path of the storm as helpless victims.

Conversely, Sarah Wiggins gives the impression through her statements and actions that she is the sly and clever protector of her family and farm. She preserves both by fooling the Yankee troops to believe they have discovered a family of Union loyalists willing to assist them in their crusade through the pine barrens of central Georgia on their way to the coast. After gladly giving all her possessions to support the troops, Sarah appeals to the leaders to spare her and her family from the anti-Unionist backlash sure to come upon the departure of Sherman’s forces.

Whatever the real truth of the encounter, the quest to solve the mysteries of the story is appealing to even the casual history buff. It is a complicated mix of historical facts and family legend that is difficult to turn away from but is also sometimes too complex to fully understand.

John Wiggins’ background prior to the relocation to EmanuelCounty is somewhat short on details in the historical record. He is believed to have been born the son of a wealthy plantation owner in Burke County, Georgia named Amos Wiggins. Amos Wiggins was the owner and operator of a large plantation in northern BurkeCounty situated along Brier Creek. Records reveal that he was among the largest land and slave owners in BurkeCounty and the state of Georgia. We do know that John married Luraney Seago, the daughter of William Seago and Rebecca Cartledge, sometime prior to 1835, likely in BurkeCounty, Georgia. The marriage produced two children, Janet Middleton and Amos P. Wiggins, before ending in divorce sometime during the period 1837 to 1839. Around 1839, John married Sarah E. Barber, the daughter of Holden Barber originally from Jefferson County, Georgia. It is believed that John’s mother and brother may have excluded him from the division of property after the death of his father due to the scandal surrounding his divorce from Luraney Seago. This is supported by his sudden relocation to EmanuelCounty.

The Wiggins family moved from an unknown location in BurkeCounty to the 700 acre farm (or plantation, as Sarah referred to it) in northern EmanuelCounty around 1849 just prior to the birth of their oldest son, George, in December of that year.  The property was situated three miles south of Summertown in the modern-day community of Blun. There remain many questions surrounding the acquisition of this property. In her claim to the SCC, Sarah asserts that she inherited the land from her uncle, Thomas Street, of JeffersonCounty.[i] However, it appears that there may have been some type of prior legal arrangements made between Thomas Barber, Sarah’s brother and appointed trustee (from the will of their uncle Thomas Street) and John Wiggins. Additionally, other legal documents support that John Wiggins made an outright purchase of the property.

Whatever the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the “plantation,” there is no doubt as to the location. In her statement to the Southern Claims Commission, Sarah gives the location of the farm as “about nine miles from Station No. 9 ½” on the Georgia Central Railroad. Station number 9 ½ was situated in the modern-day town of Midville (known as Barton at that time) just over the Ogeechee River from Emanuel County in Burke County. In fact, it is exactly nine miles from Midville to the center of Blun traveling south on Georgia Highway 56 (which follows the approximate route of the 19^th century road running through Blun from Midville to Swainsboro).

In the days leading up to the encounter, the Wiggins family likely conducted preparations in anticipation of the arrival of these Union troops.  Despite their somewhat isolated location in northern EmanuelCounty, news of the approaching would have reached them through neighbors or possibly from Confederate soldiers moving just ahead of Sherman’s forces. General Joseph Wheeler, commanding the Confederate cavalry charged with delaying the advance of Sherman’s troops, had instructed his subordinate commanders to warn all citizens in the path of Sherman’s storm. The citizens were to hide and/or destroy anything of potential value to the Union army. On November 15, 1864, Wheeler published these instructions from his Corps Headquarters:

All horses, mules, and other stock which citizens have left on the enemy’s line of march will be driven off and proper receipts left for the same. When no owner can be found, accurate, accounts will be kept, so that the stock can be reclaimed by the owner. Commanders of troops in falling back before the enemy will send reliable officers and men at least on day in advance to instruct citizens in which direction to drive their stock.[ii]

From the operational reports of General Wheeler, it isn’t possible to determine if the Confederate Cavalry actually passed by the Wiggins farm. However, it would seem that if Fighting Joe’s troopers did visit, they left the farm intact which was not the norm for Confederate Cavalry operations in advance of Sherman’s March. In fact, the cavalry troopers under Wheeler’s command gain an infamous reputation for visiting the families of Georgia even before Sherman began his march from Atlanta. The problem of pilfering the goods of Georgia farms was brought to the attention of the highest ranking Confederate commander in the state. General Hood had hardly assumed command when he published Field Order No. 14 which read in part:

The lawless seizure and destruction of private property by straggling soldiers in the rear and on the flanks of this army has become intolerable. It must come to an end. It is believed to be chargeable to worthless men, especially from mounted commands, who are odious alike to the citizen and the well-disposed soldier. Citizens and soldiers are, therefore, called upon to arrest and forward to the provost-marshal-general all persons guilty of wanton destruction or illegal seizure of property, that examples may be immediately made. The laws of war justify the execution of such offenders, and those laws shall govern.[iii]

Even if the mounted soldiers didn’t visit the farm, information from General Wheeler’s passing troops would have made it to the Wiggins family via their neighbors. Wheeler’s larger concern during the period was the Union cavalry’s threat against Augusta, so it is likely that the bulk of his force operated north of the OgeecheeRiver during this time.

 As the word had come that General Sherman’s Army was beginning its march from the smoking ruins of the city of Atlanta, the families of Georgia pondered the direction of movement for the army.  Word of the march spread through Georgia like wildfire as “Uncle Billy’s” troops began to move to the east and south. The Wiggins family may well have read the reports from a Savannah or Augusta newspaper regarding the approaching horde of blue. Some news reports, such as this one sent from Milledgeville, Georgia on November 27, 1864, described the impending threat the safety and well-being of the good citizens of Georgia:

We hear of a great many private dwellings, gin houses, and much cotton being burnt by the army on their different routes; some within sight.  Also, that several private citizens were shot.[iv]

Many of the white women of Georgia were appreciably terrified by the tales of rape, pillage and plunder at the hands of Sherman’s soldiers. As Henry Hitchcock, one of Sherman’s staff officers remembers the words of a lady along the march that the soldiers were “killing everybody and burning every house.”[v] The tales, both true and false, of Sherman’s operations in north Georgia and the areas surrounding Atlanta created a great anxiety amongst the population. Some families choose to abandon their property becoming refugees heading to areas of the state they believed to be safe from the path of Sherman’s March. Certainly, the people of all social standings lying in the path of Sherman’s march were, at the least, apprehensive and, at the worst, panicked concerning their future.

It is impossible to know Sarah Wiggins’ level of understanding about what lay in store for her family. It is likely that Sarah understood the threat represented by Sherman’s army and, knowing this, she led the Wiggins family in making appropriate preparations for General Sherman’s arrival in late November of 1864. One can certainly speculate rather accurately on the events of those final days before the army’s arrival based on the existing historical record and first-hand accounts. The sense of a coming apocalyptic storm was apparently present across the farms and plantations of Georgia. Newspaper accounts such as the one in the Savannah Republican were commonplace as Sherman’s force of over 60,000 soldiers moved through Georgia.

In March of 1864, as the Civil War began its fourth and final year, Major General William T. Sherman assumed command of the Federal Division of the Mississippi. This followed a dramatic victory by Union forces at the Battle of Chattanooga in November of 1864 and General Grant’s promotion to General-in-Chief of all Union armies. With the capture of Chattanooga, known as the “Gateway of the South” Sherman was able to prepare for an offensive in northern Georgia for the following spring. During this spring offensive, Sherman’s army was highly successful in cutting a path from Chattanooga to the outskirts of Atlanta. By July 1864, Sherman began a push around the Confederate defenses approaching Atlanta and, eventually, Confederate General Joseph Johnston withdrew his forces to the confines of the city to begin a deliberate defense of the city.

 Atlanta was a key industrial and transportation center for the Confederacy situated in the heart of the southern states and often referred to as the second capital of the Confederate States of America despite the fact that Atlanta had never served as the capital city of its own state.  Sherman realized that it was imperative for his army to capture Atlanta, denying the Confederates access to the resources of the city, if his campaign was to be considered successful. There were also high political stakes riding on Sherman’s success or failure. The successful capture of Atlanta would provide a much needed boast to Abraham Lincoln’s reelection bid against the former Army of the Potomac commander and peace Democrat, George B. McClellan.

Johnston, who was known for a more cautious approach, failed to aggressively attack Sherman’s forces as ordered by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. General Johnston preferred to remain in a defensive posture and closely adhere to his philosophy of preserving the army to fight another day. This was a constant source of disagreement between the general and the president. Johnson’s refusal to attack was not taken lightly by the Confederate president who insisted on defending key southern cities by forcefully attacking the enemy no matter the cost in men and materiel. In July of 1864, President Davis had heard enough of the excuses and conflicting strategies. He relieved Johnston of command for his failure to attack Sherman replacing him with General John Bell Hood of Kentucky. Hood was a general referred to by Robert E. Lee as a “good fighter, very industrious on the battlefield.” During the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Hood was a key player while serving as a division commander under Longstreet. At the beginning of the assault, Hood was wounded by an artillery shell exploding over his head. The exploding shell severely damaged his left arm which he was unable to make use of it for the rest of his life.

 After convalescing for many weeks in Richmond, Hood returned to division command under Longstreet at the battle of Chickamauga in September of 1863. His aggressive action broke the Federal line and enabled the Confederate forces to win the battle. However, Hood was again severely wounded during the fighting losing his right leg. Again, he recovered in Richmond, this time becoming friends with Jefferson Davis.

By the summer of 1864, Hood was ready to answer Davis’ call for him to return to the fight as the commander of the forces facing Sherman’s Army. However, the fate of the Confederate army in Atlanta was sealed even before Hood’s rise to command.

Hood did not disappoint Jefferson Davis as he aggressively attacked Sherman’s army at various points around Atlanta. His enthusiasm for battle did not match his success against Sherman’s well equipped, battle hardened veterans. Hood launched four major offensives during the summer with high causalities, all of which failed to break Sherman’s pressure on Atlanta. General Hood had no other choice now but to attempt to persevere his army.

On the first day of September 1864, after six weeks in command, General Hood abandoned the defensive works guarding Atlanta against the Union forces and, eventually, moved the preponderance of his army to the north. For the majority of the Confederate troops under Hood’s command, they had seen the last of William T. Sherman. By evacuating Atlanta’s defenses and moving north, General Hood left open the door of the city and gave up the remaining stronghold of industrial and logistical might for the Confederacy. Atlanta would now receive the wrath of the occupying Union forces under Sherman.

 Although Sherman’s forces quickly occupied the city, the general knew that it was only a matter of time before the rebel troops would rebound and begin to reorganize in preparation for conducting offensive operations against his army.  Understanding the likely actions of the Confederate Army, Sherman devised a controversial plan to first evacuate all civilians from the city of Atlanta which he had declared to be a military post and then have one element of his force move to attack the retreating Confederate army to the north. Upon successful execution of his plan, Sherman’s army would significantly reduce the threat posed by the Confederate forces under Hood drawing him away from the intended Union line of march with a force under Union General George Thomas. Hood offensive against Sherman’s Line of Communication from Atlanta to Chattanooga provided the opening for Thomas to give chase.

In November, as Sherman evacuated the city, he ordered all “militarily significant” structures to be put to the torch. As would happen later in Columbia, South Carolina, the fire spread beyond these structures and burned many non-military structures as well giving rise to the tale that Sherman had deliberately burned Atlanta to the ground.  Although Sherman hadn’t ordered the complete destruction of the city, the results of the fire were devastating for the second most important city in the Confederacy.

As for Sherman’s thoughts on the burning of Atlanta, it seems to have been written off as collateral damage which might have been avoided altogether if not for the rebellious attitudes of the southern citizens. Sherman’s primary concern centered on winning the war as quickly as possible in order to restore the Union. To accomplish this objective required not only defeating the Confederate forces at hand, but eliminating the southern states means of supporting the war effort. The by-product of this endeavor would be tremendous privation and suffering for the people of Georgia. The General’s thoughts on the effects of war upon the population are evidenced in his forthright response to the appeals of the mayor and city council of Atlanta concerning the evacuation of the city prior to the fire:

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against the terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.[vi]

With the shattered, smoking remains of a mostly vacant Atlanta behind him, it was time for “Cump” Sherman to progress to the next phase of his grand strategic plan. Promising President Lincoln and General-in-Chief Grant that he could “make Georgia howl,” Sherman’s army began its “March to the Sea” from Atlanta in November of 1864.  Sherman opined that “until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses and people will cripple their military resources… I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.”[vii]

Sherman’s plan to destroy the remaining logistical infrastructure of the state of Georgia was intended to deny resources to the Confederate soldiers in the field and to break the popular will of the people of the southern states. Sherman wanted to demonstrate that for the Confederacy to continue the war was futile and that the citizens of the south would pay a great price for supporting the war effort. Further, he intended to prove that a Union army could move freely about the Confederate states without any serious hindrance from southern forces.   Sherman planned to supply his army from the “fat” of the land until he was able to establish a sea-based resupply operation using the ports in and around Savannah. The “fat” of the land would include many of the farms throughout central and south Georgia like the Wiggins farm.

To his credit, Sherman had carefully studied pre-war records as to the ability of the Georgia heartland to support his army and how the people might react to the presence of his army. He also drew of his knowledge of the terrain, culture and people gained during a tour through the state as a young Army lieutenant. Based on his familiarity and experience, Sherman was so confident in the ability of his army to live off the land that he wrote his wife, Ellen, prior to the march, “We won’t starve in Georgia.” [viii]

The general realized that the success of his plan was dependent upon keeping the army in motion toward the final destination. To slow or stop the army would quickly deplete the available resources and allow the enemy to conduct a deliberate attack. As a key part of his plan for the march, Sherman maintained an amazingly high level of operational security as to his final objective for the push through Georgia. He kept the few observers from the Confederate army confused as to his true intentions upon departing Atlanta. In fact, Confederate military and political leaders were kept in a great state of confusion as Sherman’s Left Wing made a feint toward Augusta and the Right Wing moved toward Macon. For several weeks, the commanders of the opposing Confederate forces believed Sherman would attack Macon, Augusta, or both. This meant that state and Confederate

troops were never able to mass in one location bringing unified opposition against the Union army. For an army with too few soldiers to start with, assembling, organizing and moving with an army capable of stopping the march would be impossible. As Sherman would later write in his memories, his objective for the campaign was “to place my army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his forces to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston.”[ix]

Not until several weeks into the movement of Federal troops did Confederate commanders and Georgia’s political leaders realize Sherman’s true intention of capturing the city of Savannah and establishing contact with the Federal Navy along the Georgia coast. The meager forces available to the Confederates to defend Georgia were divided between Macon, Augusta and Savannah. By the time Confederate leaders understood that Sherman was committing his forces to march to the coast, little could be done to stop him from attacking and securing the port of Savannah.

Recognizing that the march would require speed and maneuver never before demonstrated in the history of warfare, Sherman issued orders to his troops to take freely any supplies needed to sustain their march. He acknowledged that he would not allow his army to be hindered with the burden of maintaining long lines of supply in the rear of the army. It would be necessary to break contact with his supply base in Atlanta as he moved to the Atlantic Ocean. Although his orders contain instructions to forge “liberally on the country,” Sherman’s order also describes a systematic plan with specific directions for gathering the needed materiel to sustain his army on the move. 

General Sherman’s order of November 9, 1864 reads as follows:

 Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,

in the Field, Kingston, Georgia, November 9, 1864

 1. For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided into two wings, viz.:

The right wing, Major-General O.O. Howard, commanding, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, major-General H.W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.

2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.

3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 a.m., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

 4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days’ provisions for his command, and three days’ forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging-parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled.

5. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.

6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging-parties may also take mules or horses, to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules  for the regiments of brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, given written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and this his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

8. The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, composed if possible of Negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practise the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

9. Captain O.M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and the commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at all times.

By order of Major-General W.T. Sherman,L. M. Dayton, Aide-de-Camp.

Within a few weeks of departing the confines of Atlanta, the two corps of General Oliver O. Howard, operating as the Right Wing of Sherman’s Army, was approaching EmanuelCounty on their infamous “March to the Sea.”

The Union Army’s Order of Battle for the “March to the Sea”

Commanding General, Major General William T. Sherman

• RIGHT WING, Major General O. O. Howard.
  • Fifteenth CORPS, Major General P. J. Osterhaus.
    • DIVISIONS.
      • Brig. Gen. C. R. Wood’s
      • Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen’s
      • Brig. Gen. J. E. Smith’s
      • Brig. Gen. J. M. Corse’s
  • Seventeenth CORPS, Frank P. Blair, Jr.
    • DIVISIONS.
      • Maj. Gen. J. A. Mower’s
      • Brig. Gen. M. D. Leggett’s.
      • Brig. Gen. G. A. Smith’s.
• LEFT WING, Major General H. W. Slocum.
  • Fourteenth CORPS, Brev. Major General Jeff. C. Davis
    • DIVISIONS.
      • Brig. Gen. W. P. Carlin’s.
      • Brig. Gen. J. D. Morgan’s.
      • Brig. Gen. A. Baird’s
  • Twentieth CORPS, Brigadier General A. S. Williams.
    • DIVISIONS.
      • Brig. Gen. N. T. Jackson’s.
      • Brig. Gen. J. W. Geary’s
      • Brig. Gen. W. T. Ward’s.
• 3^rd Cavalry Division, Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick

The Right Wing commander of Sherman’s Army, Oliver Otis Howard, was a career U.S. Army officer who as a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac suffered two humiliating defeats, first at Chancellorsville and later that year at Gettysburg. After these defeats, Howard was transferred to the Western theater where he found greater success as both a corps and army commander. In the Battle of Chattanooga, Howard led his corps in the assault that resulted in the capture of Missionary Ridge forcing the retreat of Confederate General Braxton Bragg. After Major General James McPherson was killed in the Battle of Atlanta, Howard was picked by Sherman as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. Selected to command the right wing of Sherman’s army on the March to the Sea, Howard continued in that role during the final campaign through the Carolinas in 1865.

General Howard is one of three Union officers mentioned by name in Sarah Wiggins’ claim before the Southern Claims Commission.[x] From the wording of her statement to the SCC, it is appears that Sarah and her children may have personally encountered Howard at some point after leaving her farm on the evening of November 30, 1864. According to the official reports and the testimony of Emily Wiggins before the Southern Claims Commission, General Howard’s Right Wing Headquarters was co-located with the 15^th Corps Headquarters spending the night of November 30^th on a plantation owned by John R. Wells. This plantation was located near the intersection of the Old Savannah Road and modern-day Georgia Highway 56.[xi]

Howard was known to many as the “Christian General.” He was deeply concerned about the plight of freed slaves and other persons displaced by the March to the Sea. General Howard was a well known humanitarian who would later be instrumental in the establishment of the Freedmen’s Bureau providing assistance for former slaves and other displaced southerners.

During the march through both Georgia and the Carolinas, Howard was known to receive many of the individuals seeking protection from the bummers of Sherman’s Army. He was also noted for providing relief for the suffering. For example, during the occupation

of Columbia, South Carolina, General Howard granted an audience to one German businessman who had suffered losses at the hands of Union soldiers. In a gesture of benevolence toward the man, Howard offered to take the offended man along with the army until they reach the coast. Once at a suitable seaport, Howard would ensure the man received transportation to the North or onward to Europe.[xiii]

Although we cannot be sure of Howard’s interaction with the Wiggins family, it would have certainly been within character for the general to offer assistance to Sarah and her children. This would be especially true if Sarah was thought to be a Union loyalist hoping to escape the post-invasion retribution of her Confederate neighbors. Also, Sherman’s General Order Number 119 issued on November 8, 1864 prior to the departure from Atlanta gave subordinate commanders some flexibility in dealing with citizens along the march who desired sanctuary with the army.

All surplus servants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those of the past.[xiv]  

Major General Peter J. Osterhaus, commanding general, 15th Corps, Right Wing of Sherman’s Army

It is highly unlikely that “Uncle Billy” Sherman himself ever set foot near the farm of John and Sarah Wiggins. However, this does not exclude the possibility that Sarah and her children may have encountered the general as will be discussed later. Although traveling with the Right Wing of his army during this period, Sherman’s party returned to the Left Wing on the far side of the OgeecheeRiver just prior to entering EmanuelCounty. The general and his staff likely came no closer than Station 9 ½ on the east bank of OgeecheeRiver at Barton (modern-day Midville). Sherman left the duties of commanding and controlling the far right flank of his army to Major General Howard. The journal entry for November 30, 1864 by Major Henry Hitchcock of General Sherman’s staff confirms his location for the night:

Fifteenth day out, in camp on east bank of Ogeechee River at Burton, The ‘wire-grass region’ proper extends east to the Ogeechee River…Railroad here at Station is say 200 to 250 yards from river bank. Very good brick station house…[i]

It is an undisputed fact of history that the southern wing of General Sherman’s Army, commanded by Maj. Gen. Howard, passed near the present day community of Blun, Georgia on the 29th and 30th of November 1864.  Although the precise facts of what transpired that day and in the days that followed are colored by family lore, it is certain that elements of General Howard’s Right Wing visit the Wiggins farm.

This family legend came to my mother and me via my grandmother, Lizzie Dalceda Wiggins Davis, the daughter of George Wiggins. Other siblings and cousins handed down the oral tradition of the Wiggins family encounter with the Yankee soldiers to the successive generations as well.  It is most probable that Lizzie received her version of the story from her father, George Washington Wiggins, which she then passed on to her children and grandchildren.  Other cousins in the Wiggins family have confirmed many of the key events of the incident in the retelling of the story over the years although details vary greatly. As the 14-year old son of John and Sarah Wiggins, George was a primary witness to the events of those days in late November 1864.  It is important to note that George was not present during the encounter with the Union soldiers at the Wiggins farm. According to the traditional family retelling of the story, George played the role of hero for the family, saving much of the farm’s livestock from falling into the hands of the Yankee invaders while his mother and sisters were taken away by Sherman’s soldiers after their refusal to cooperate with the foragers.

The oral version of events handed down through the Wiggins family follows a very simple story line.  On or about the 29th of November 1864, the soldiers of General Howard’s wing of Sherman’s Army made their appearance at the front door of Sarah Wiggins.  Many of the local populace had sounded the warning of the approaching army several days before.  This advanced warning allowed Sarah time to provide a measure of protection for a portion of her farm assets by gathering as much of the livestock as possible and sending them into the swamp of the North Prong Creek under the charge of her eldest son, George.  This oral version tells us that Sarah also sent along in George’s care was his five-year-old brother, William.  As will be discussed later, I do not believe that William accompanied his older brother into the North Prong Creek swamp.

The story continues that Sarah and the five girls prepared for the approach of the soldiers by continuing to hide food and valuables.  When the Union army arrived at the Wiggins “plantation,” Sarah was forced to give all possessions of any value to the soldiers. It is recounted that she was less than fully cooperative with the Yankee soldiers an act for which she was taken into “custody” or “kidnapped” by Union forces. 

Based on the size of the farm, the Union soldiers confronted Sarah with the charge that she was withholding the location of some of the other farm assets particularly the livestock. During the encounter with the Wiggins family, as the story was retold, the officer in charge who suspected that Sarah was trying to hide some of her assets and was being less than fully truthful with the foraging party forcefully questioned her. As he began to query her in greater detail concerning the whereabouts of the rest of the farm’s assets, the growingly defiant Sarah refused to reveal the location of the livestock.  Because of her repudiation of the officer’s claim that she was hiding additional loot and her refusal to cooperate, Sarah and her girls were forced (the word “kidnapped” was used quite often in the retelling) to accompany Sherman’s army to Savannah.  Upon the capture of Savannah, Sherman’s army placed Sarah and her children on a boat and sent them to an undisclosed location in the northern states.  There they lived until the end of the war when they return to Georgia.[ii]

Until I began the research of these events, our family was unaware that a written historical record, including first-hand witness statements, existed for this incident.  Sarah Wiggins, likely unknowingly, left us an invaluable document that provides a wealth of information about the family of John and Sarah Wiggins in addition to detailing the story of the encounter with Sherman’s soldiers.  This document is a claim against the government of the United States, along with all supporting documents and statements, filed on her behalf before the Southern Claims Commission in the 1870s. The claim and support statements provide a wealth of information regarding these events. 

Even with the SCC documents, the complete story of what happened on the Wiggins farm during those November days in 1864 will likely never be known completely. The claim lacks detail regarding the encounter with the soldiers plus family lore has been “improved” and colored by years of retelling making it difficult to sort out fact and fiction.  The accurate version of the story most likely resides somewhere between the family legend and the statements made to the SCC.  A broader analysis of Sarah Wiggins’ claim will be presented later.

There are some details of the story that we can have a high degree of confidence of their validity. For instance, it is certainly true that soldiers from Sherman’s Army first appeared at the doorsteps of Sarah Wiggins’ home on or about the 29^th of November in 1864. There seems to be no evidence that would suggest this was fabricated in any way and the historical record supports it.  The claim would have likely been immediately dismissed if the Union troops had never visited the Wiggins farm that day.

The movement of Sherman’s army in the approximate location of Blun and Summerville (modern-day Summertown – located approximately 3 miles north of Blun) is confirmed in various diaries and other historical documents. The best known route of march for the 15^th Corps of Howard’s Right Wing shows that the headquarters spent the night of November 29, 1864 at Sutherland’s Mill which appears to have been located due west of modern-day Blun with some advance troops and foragers reaching the vicinity of the Wiggins’ farm that day. On the morning of the 30^th, the Corps Headquarters with the 4^th Division moved first to the east and then turned slightly north in the direction of Summerville.[iii] These forces may have moved along the modern-day Blun Road until reaching the road junction in the center of Blun where they turned left (north) onto modern-day Underwood Loop to head north toward Summerville. Modern-day Underwood Loop follows the route of the 19^th century road that ran between Swainsboro and Midville (Barton).

From my research of the official reports, maps and diary entries, the most likely date that the Wiggins family could have encounter Union soldiers would have been November 29, 1864 when some advance pickets or scouts may have made it as far as Blun. There were likely many soldiers at the farm as Sarah claims on the 30^th due to the size of the elements moving near Blun and the pace of the Army’s movement. 15,000 soldiers (half the number in the Right Wing of the army) with their associated animals and wagons would certainly take two days to clear the area. As will be discussed later, the train of some 1,900 head of cattle passed over this route and spent the night of the 30^th of November on the Wiggins farm. According to her statement, Sarah and the children departed from her “plantation” to travel with Sherman’s Army on the evening of November 30, 1864.[iv]

I find one of the most significant clues that helps unravel part of this mystery is the conspicuous absence from the itemized claim and the supporting statements of any mention of mules or milk cow(s). There’s only one horse and 6 beef cattle listed on the claim.[v] Based on the expert opinions of individuals experienced in farming with animal power, it is estimated that a farm the size of the Wiggins “plantation” (100 acres in cultivation as Sarah claims in her statement) would have required several horses and/or mules to pull the farm implements and perform other tasks. Sarah only claimed “one bay horse” to the SCC.[vi] Also, the family would have required at least two good milk cows to support their dietary needs for a family of that size.

Based on these and other facts, my speculation is that 14-year old George took some portion of the family’s livestock and other farm assets deep into the swamp of the North Prong Creek prior to the arrival of Sherman’s Army in general vicinity of Blun on the 28^th of November 1864. With a great deal of certainty, I believe that young William did not accompany his older brother into the swamps for reasons I will explain in detail later. The absence of milk cows, mules and a wagon appears to offer a veiled clue confirming that some of the livestock was hidden with George in the swamp as our family story has long held. Since all three of these farm assets were extremely valuable to the basic survival of any farm family in the 19^th century, it would seem logical that Sarah would have made the decision to hide them from the Yankee soldiers.

Also, I discovered a rather fascinating statement made by Sarah Wiggins in her claim. In her disposition statement Sarah claims that she “could have concealed my property and prevented the army from getting it but I preferred and I felt it was my duty to do all I could for the union cause.” The confidence with which she makes this strong statement leads me to believe that her confidence is born of experience. Of course, this is easy to see with hindsight 140 years later. Given the other false and misleading parts of her statement, it is certainly possible that Sarah was making this assertion from experience.

As stated earlier, I do not believe that George accompanied his mother, younger brother and sisters when they left the farm in the company of Sherman’s Army. Additionally, Sarah’s SCC statement refers to her “seven” children. In fact, she had eight children at this time including George. Interestingly, in the same statement, Sarah later refers to her “eight” children when relating that her present family situation during the time of the claim submission. All her children were born prior to 1864, so this leads to the conclusion that one of her children did not accompany Sherman’s army to Savannah.

To my knowledge, no details of the trip north were handed down through the generations of our family from George Wiggins. If George had accompanied Sarah, William and his sisters to New York and on to Indiana, it seems he would have shared this important experience with his children. There are a number of open questions regarding the travels of the Wiggins family to the north that require additional research as will be discussed later.

Hiding from Sherman’s troops in the swamps with cows, mules, and possibly other livestock, George would have faced some significant challenges. In 1864, the foliage surrounding North Prong Creek would have been exceptionally restrictive to human movement and the woods would have been alive with all manner of creatures. Thick stands of virgin timber, both hardwood and pine, and dense underbrush along water-logged wiregrass made this terrain difficult to navigate even for a native.  In the years after the war, the Wiggins family would turn this timber into a business, but in 1864 it was still quite undisturbed.

The presence of snakes, briars and “wait-a-minute” vines would have discouraged even the most adventurous Union soldiers from conducting a thorough search for the livestock.  Since John Wiggins owned about 700 acres of land adjacent to or including the northern branch of Prong Creek, George would have been very familiar with the terrain. The southwestern area of the Wiggins farm was crossed by the seasonal tributary known as Hog Pen Branch. Hog Pen Branch joined North Prong Creek south of the Wiggins home and continued until it reached the Canoochee Creek. It’s likely that George Wiggins participated in numerous activities over this landscape during his boyhood including hunting, fishing, and cutting wood. There can be little dispute that George would have had a significant advantage over any Union troops who might have attempted to find him hiding with the livestock deep in the swamp.

Major General Osterhaus, commanding general of Sherman’s 15^th Corps of the Right Wing, gave a graphic description of the countryside encountered by the Union forces as they made their way from Johnson County into northern Emanuel County.

The ground permitting, I ordered a parallel road to be cut for about two miles to a fork which led into a road that ran parallel to that taken by Woods and Corse. The country here is almost a perfect wilderness-long-leaved pines cover the poor sandy soil but sparely, marsh, lined with narrow skirts of shrub-like undergrowth, breaks this monitory; but what makes the soil almost worthless for agricultural purposes rendered it favorable to our operations. An energetic corps of axmen to corduroy roads across the creeks and marshes opens in a short time enough space for any number of columns.[vii]

These “corduroy roads” were built by cross logs and placing them along a path perpendicular to the direction of travel. The timbers in the soft sand would allow the wagon trains of the army to gain traction and not sink in the deep sand and mud. However, any passengers in the wagons were in for a bumpy ride and marching over these roads was difficult and tiring. Based on the writings of General Osterhaus and others in the 15^th Corps, much of the distance travel by the Corps through western EmanuelCounty would have been over roads cut through the woods, many of those being corduroy roads.

The modern map below indicates the likely area of the North Prong Creek swamp that George Wiggins hid out in with the livestock:

In an attempt to evade the swarming army of “bummers,” it was common practice for many Georgia citizens to hide their farm assets in the face of the invading army. It seems the Georgia governor’s call to destroy anything of value lying in the invader’s path when mostly unheeded. Being out of the mainstream was nothing new for Joe Brown. Governor Brown was known as a maverick from the beginning of the war resisting almost every attempt by the central government of Jefferson Davis to gain more control of state resources. Interestingly, as Atlanta was falling to Sherman’s army in September of 1864, Brown granted furloughs to about 10,000 Georgia militiamen leaving Georgia even more unprotected from Sherman’s advance.

The governor’s call aside, the good people of Georgia demonstrated their loyalty to a pair of institutions even more esteemed than the state or the Confederacy…the family and the land. Most families along Sherman’s route of march were likely only trying to preserve their farm assets not destroy them. The Georgia populace along the anticipated route of march continued to do everything within their power to safeguard their farms and plantations from the swarm of locust in blue.

One example of Georgia residents of the area hiding their farm assets in the swamps is found in the diary of a Union soldier marching as a part of Sherman’s force.  Lieutenant Cornelius C. Platter, of the 81st Ohio Infantry Volunteers, kept such a diary during Sherman’s march through Georgia and the Carolinas from November, 1864 – April 27, 1865. 

On November 28, 1864, he recorded in his diary:

Quite a number of Horses & Mules were captured in the swamps today also some liquors – The Citizens to whom the animals belonged were hiding from the Yankees in the Swamps – some of them had come 30 mile from Sandersville.[viii]

Even General Howard, in his report of the campaign filed during the occupation of Savannah, commented on the tendency of citizens to hide their livestock in the swamps. He assigns equal responsibility to his forces and those of Confederate Cavalry commander General Wheeler for the panic of the fair citizens.

His report for November 29, 1864 states:

The character of the country, open pine woods, wire grass, quite a number of swamps along the OhoopeeRiver and its tributaries, very few clearings or plantations. Quite a number of mules and horses were captured in the swamps, the citizens having run them off, in the hope of escaping our army and Wheeler’s cavalry.[ix]

As indicated by the assets listed (see chart below) in Sarah’s claim to the SCC, the Wiggins family was likely very abundantly stocked for the winter months ahead. John and Sarah Wiggins would not have been considered to be wealthy by the standards of the 1860s. The Wiggins family owned a sizeable tract of land over 700 total acres with 100 of it in cultivation. It seems likely that they possessed a fairly large amount of livestock and farm products. The farm land was apparently extremely productive as where many other farms throughout the region. As indicated by her SCC claim, Sarah and her children had been able to produce more than enough food to provide for themselves during the two years of John’s absence in the Confederate Army.

Also, based on information from her statement, we believe that John and Sarah Wiggins owned at least one household slave. This is confirmed in the statements of Sarah and her two daughters.

Here is a listing of the assets taken from the family farm as enumerated by Sarah Wiggins in her SCC statement:[x]

TABLE 1: Itemized SCC Claim of Sarah Wiggins.

Even today, there is a commonly held notion that the Confederate states were “starving” by the fall/winter of 1864. This appears to be far from the truth. While the Confederate army may have faced supply shortages during this period, much of it appears to be a problem with distribution, not the availability of supplies. Much like the Wiggins “plantation,” the farms of South Georgia were fully stocked from a bumper crop during the summer and fall harvests of 1864. This is confirmed in the dispatches of a reporter from New York City who accompanied Sherman’s army through Georgia.

Sherman’s march has fully exploded the common error that the rebellion could be starved out; that the constant drain upon the white working classes to fill the armies of the confederacy would leave the ground untilled, and granaries unfilled. Wherever we moved, from Covington to Savannah, every plantation was abundantly stocked, and the barns groaned under the corn and wheat that the fall harvest had produced. Every farm house yard was decorated with sweet potato pits and corn bins, which were very thoroughly cleared out by the men in their search for the of life.[xi]  

If the itemized list from the SCC claim is close to accurate, the Wiggins farm was well supplied for the winter months and seems to have been relatively untouched by the war, so far. The bounty of the farm would be prime picking for the foragers of the Union army. Sarah Wiggins was not ready to willingly part with her assets and may have concocted a scheme to save her family and farm from complete ruin. She would meet the Union army head on.

Obituary of Gideon R. Kellams, commander of the 42nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment

In her SCC statement, Sarah makes specific mention on the officer she encounter at her farm. In the petition section of the claim, Sarah states that the “[items] were used by the United States Army by Captain G. Kellums, and other officers and soldiers belonging to Genl Howard’s Corps, Genl W.T. Sherman’s army.” It seems unlikely that this officer is anyone other than Captain Gideon R. Kellams, commander of the 42nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Even though Kellams was recently promoted to Major (and eventually promoted to Colonel), he continued to be referred to as “Captain,” even in official reports during the Savannah campaign.

Kellams was born in 1828 and was reading to become a lawyer in 1861 when he joined the 42nd as a Lieutenant. He seems to have been well respected by subordinates and superiors as an officer and leader of soldiers through many engagements and battles of the Civil War. Kellams picked up where he left off in the practice of law in Spencer County, Indiana after the war specializing in pension claims demonstrating his continued concern for the well-being of soldiers from the war. He and his wife, Maria Egnew Kellams, were, by all accounts, upstanding citizens in SpencerCounty. Kellams and his wife died within days of one another and a joint obituary testified to their status in the community: 

He was one of that class of soldiers who saw his duty to life always in the line of service and consequently his hospital record is a very meager one. He spent more than one hundred days on the firing line. Where ever a 42nd man may be found, there is one who unreservedly gives willing evidence of the loyalty, bravery and unselfish friendship of Colonel Kellams. His career as soldier is one his children may ever reverence and refer to with pride.

The mother [Maria Kellams] left to look after the wants of the large family at home, did bravely her share of service for her country. No less honor, no less glory is due the mother who did battle at home, than the father who battled in the field. Mrs. Kellams was known best in her home. That, she loved and honored. She would make any sacrifice for her children. She loved her home and the things about it. Every chicken and every flower was her pet, and in these she was ever vary near to the soul of nature around us.[i]

The Kellams family certainly seems to be the type of honorable people who might have facilitated the northern movement and temporary resettlement of the Wiggins family. The Kellams home was located in SpencerCounty in southern Indiana, just one county over to the southwest of GibsonCounty (Princeton).

Also, Kellams had left behind eight children at home in Indiana including a son the same age as George Wiggins and a baby girl born in September of 1864. Many of his children were the same age as the Wiggins children which may have given the Union officer an extra measure of empathy for the plight of the family. Sarah’s story of her Union loyalty would have provided additional motivation for Kellams to protect them.

As a member of the 42^nd Captain Kellams had proven himself to be a dependable officer who displayed great calmness and control in the midst of the fight. After the Atlanta campaign, his regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel W. T. B. McIntire, complemented Kellams’ performance in battle during his absence. “I take great pleasure in saying that the latter-named officer has upon several different occasions distinguished himself by him coolness and bravery in times of danger” writes McIntire in his official report of the battle.[ii]

The post-war view of Gideon Kellams’ performance as a leader and eventual regimental commander was unquestionably positive. This was made plain by the description of his character during the service to his country written in his obituary. Kellams was known to be loyal, brave and unselfish as a commander of troops, qualities that certainly endeared him to the soldiers under his command and would have given him a bent toward non-combatants harmed by the war through no fault of their own. In addition to these comments, Kellams biographical sketch published in 1892 as a part of S.F. Horrall’s History of the Forty-Second Indiana Volunteer Infantry, states that Kellams “had [his men’s] entire confidence, and he likewise enjoyed, to the fullest, the confidence of his superior officers at all times.”[iii]

Sarah Wiggins’ SCC statement taken with official accounts and diaries of soldiers provides a solid connection of the Wiggins family with Captain Kellams and the 42^nd Indiana. Research into every name similar in spelling to the “Kellums” of her statement leaves Gideon Kellams as the most closely related name of a Union Captain that could have been in the vicinity of the Wiggins farm on those particular days.  

Key to the connection with the 42^nd Indiana is the location and route of march for the regiment during movement from Atlanta to Savannah. The regiment was assigned to a unique detail during the march. Part of Sherman’s plan for contingency resupply of his army during the march was to have “on hand a good supply of beef-cattle to be driven along on the hoof.”[iv] To move this herd of cattle, estimated to be around 1900 head, it would require a large number of soldiers. Although normally part of the units assigned to the Left Wing of Sherman’s Army, at the beginning of the march while still in Atlanta, the 42^nd was place on a special detail duty of herding the massive quantity of cattle accompanying the army. Based primarily on diary entries and post-war writings of members of the 42^nd, it would appear that the regiment was moving on a general route of march that closely mirror the Right Wing of Sherman’s Army during the March to the Sea.

Moving the cattle following the 15^th Corps, the 42nd had the opportunity to pass through the vicinity of the Wiggins’ farm during the period of November 30 to December 1, 1864. The Right Wing commander, Major General O.O. Howard confirms that the cattle herd was following his units and that they were ordered to march on a route that would bring them in close proximity to the Wiggins farm. In his Special Field Orders Number 179, dated November 27, 1864, Howard issues the following instructions to his subordinate commanders:

Headquarters will be at Johnson to-morrow night, the train moving with the leading division of right column. The herds of cattle (other than those belonging to divisions) will follow the right column to Johnson, a regiment from the read division of which will remain at this point till everything is passed, and will then follow on to Johnson, carefully guarding all roads leading south.[v]

This was also confirmed in the campaign account of Brigadier General John M. Corse commanding the 4^th Division of the 15^th Corps when he reported that his division was “incumbered by the pontoon train, about 300 wagons belonging to the cavalry division, and a drove of 3,000 head of cattle, struggled through the mud and swamps.”[vi]

Later, in his report of the campaign, Howard confirms the assigned route of march was followed.

The next day (29th) the two lower columns nearly formed a junction, the advance, under General Woods, encamping near Summerville, and the rest along the lower Savannah road and near Sunderland’s Mills, some seven miles to the rear of General Woods; the Seventeenth Corps on the upper Savannah road, abreast of Station Numbers 10 of the Georgia Central Railroad.

November 30, Generals Woods and Corse’s divisions pushed on through Summerville northward, until they reached the upper Savannah road, and encamped near Deep Creek.[vii]

Several diary entries of soldiers assigned to the 42^nd also attest to the veracity of the Wiggins family’s claimed encounter. The fact that the regiment was detailed to move over 1900 head of cattle for Sherman’s army is established in the autobiography of Sergeant Francis M. Carlisle of Company D, 42^nd Indiana:

Then we made our famous march to the sea through Georgia. Our Regiment was put on extra service, and we drove 1900 head of beef cattle through in rear of our army. Those cattle had been shipped from the north early in the summer before, and had been herded along in our rear, and was so poor that we could hear the bones crack every step; they would travel until they give out and would lie down to die. We got through with about 1500 head. They were too poor for us to eat them as we lived off the country as we went through. Our cattle traveled so slow that we were in great danger of being captured by the rebel cavalry that followed us for that purpose.[viii]

As Carlisle notes, the cattle herd was a slow moving train. So slow that the soldiers of the 42^nd felt a real danger of being overtaken by the Confederate cavalry units thought to be trailing Sherman’s army. This make the overnight location of the 42^nd some distance behind the last units of the XV Corps who pushed through Summertown during the day on the 30^th.

The assignment of the 42^nd to the livestock herding detail is confirmed in the journal of another soldier from the regiment, William H. McCleary. McCleary notes the date of November 5, 1864 as the day the newly crowned “cowboys” of the 42^nd Indiana received their orders to report for the duty. The Captain that McCleary is ordered to report to for duty is likely a commissary officer for Sherman’s army charged with the safe passage of these 1900 cattle.

Regt got orders to report to Capt. Todd to guard cattle. Got there at 10 AM a distance of 2-1/2 miles.[ix]

Later in his diary, McCleary notes that the regiment is still guarding and caring for the large herd of cattle. On Tuesday, November 22^nd, he reports that “didn’t go but short distance till we stoped and fed cattle.”[x]

Guarding and herding the cattle was likely a dirty, thankless job that was a source of many complaints by the troops of the 42^nd. However, there were benefits to being a part of this duty especially when the local supply of food began to run short. Later in his diary, McCleary mentions that during periods of lean pickings on the part of the foragers, the soldiers would appropriate some of the rations intended for the cattle to feed themselves. On November 13^th, McCleary states that his regiment had “plenty of rations now as we steal some from the cattle.”[xi]

Most convincingly, the statement of Emily Wiggins to the SCC confirms the presence of the cattle herds at the Wiggins farm on the 30^th of November 1864.

The herders and cattle drivers of Genl Sherman’s army were encamped around the premises of the claimant and the cattle [belonging to Sarah Wiggins] were never seen by witness after the army passed.[xii]

Guarding the cattle following the Right Wing of the army would have placed the 42^nd near the Wiggins farm, but there is also other collaborating evidence pointing toward Captain Kellums and the 42^nd Indiana as the soldiers encountered by Sarah and her children. Interestingly, the diary entries of McCleary seem to support Sarah’s claim of an encounter with the soldiers of the 42nd:

Tuesday, November 29, 1864: Morning clear and pleasant. Marched at daylight east direction. Passed through fine growth of yellow pine half hour by sun. Got word the Rebels is in our rear. Made good time went in camp at dusk distance 17 miles. Got plenty of forage.

Wednesday 30: Morning clear and pleasant. Marched at daylight south very nice country.

Marching very hard. Some desolate families down here. Citizens say Rebs passed here yesterday 2 Regts strong. Went in camp at sunset distance 20 miles. Got no forage. I tried for a hog. Didn’t find.

Thursday, December 1: Morning clear and pleasant. Marched at daylight four miles to Somerville (not on map). Halted there 2 or 3 hours. Very pore looking place almost burned down. Marched on. I got a lot of sweet potatoes. Went in camp at dark. I went and heard some ladys sing.

Friday, December 2, 1864: Morning cloudy some appearance of rain. Marched at daylight. Some women came along with us this morning. We had a pretty bad road today. Made about 10 miles. Went in campabit before night. Got plenty of forage. Women at head quarters some 5 or 6.[xiii]

These diary entries seem to confirm that this regiment would have been in the general area of the Wiggins farm, ie., “four miles from Somerville [Summertown]” and that some ladies had accompanied his regiment. I believe it’s highly likely that McCleary is referring to the Wiggins family with these entries. First, he refers to “desolate families” encountered on November 30th. If Sarah had sent George into Prong Creek swamp with the bulk of the family farm produce and livestock, it would have appeared that Sarah and the girls (plus little William) were in a rather destitute situation possibly created by foraging Union troops who visited the farm on November 29th. With no men there to help with the farming duties or provide protection, the Wiggins family must have presented a very bleak picture to McCleary and his fellow soldiers of the 42nd.

Also, these families, ie., “citizens,” that McCleary refers to appear to have cooperated with the Union soldiers by providing information concerning the movement of Confederate forces. If Sarah’s statement is to be believed, she was sympathetic to the Union cause and, naturally, would have offered up any intelligence about Confederate forces that she might have.  Even if Sarah was executing a cleverly devised plan to deceive the Union soldiers, providing information, real or contrived, on the movement of Confederate forces would have given strong support to her claims of Union loyalty. Of course, Sarah would not have been of aware of the possibility of a future claim against the government since the law creating the Southern Claims Commission was not enacted until 1871.

Additionally, it is possible that the first soldiers to appear at the Wiggins farm may have been assigned to other units in the Right Wing commanded by General Howard. If so, these may have been the troops that “foraged” from the Wiggins farm on the 29^th of November leaving the property to appear rather barren by the time the 42^nd arrived the next day. The first division commanded by Brigadier General Charles R. Woods and the fourth division commanded by Brigadier General John M. Corse were instructed by their corps commander to follow “a very dim road (called the Democrat road) to its intersection with the Swainsborough and old Savannah Road” for the march of the 29^th of November.[xiv] This would have placed the brigades and regiments very near the Wiggins farm on the 29^th.

During the time before the arrival of Kellams’ soldiers, Sarah may have been able to formulate her plan to go north with her family. This is speculation, but the initial shock of meeting the foragers of Woods and Corse may have forced Sarah to develop a plan of action to preserve her family and farm. It is also possible that she had fully cooperated with the Union troops she met on November 29^th and, just as she recounted in her SCC statement, was afraid for the safety and well-being of her family if they remained in EmanuelCounty. So, upon meeting Captain Kellams and the members of the 42^nd Indiana on the 30^th of November, Sarah knew she had to act quickly and decisively.

The Southern Claims Commission testimony of both Emily and Martha Wiggins support the fact that the family departed from home joining the march with the federal army on the evening of the 30^th. Emily puts it this way in her statement:

I remember the date because on the 30^th Nov 1864 in the evening the claimant, myself and the balance of the family went north with the federal army by way of Savannah, Geo.[xv]

The 42nd Indiana appears to have spent the night of November 30th in the general vicinity of the Wiggins farm because at daylight they moved four miles to Somerville (Summertown) which was, in fact, about 3 to 4 miles from Blun and the Wiggins farm. This means that the Wiggins family could have joined them in camp on the evening of the 30^th as Emily and Martha claim in their respective statements.

Viewed as a holistic body of evidence, the diary of McCleary, the autobiography of Carlisle, the reports of the Right Wing units, and, most importantly, the SCC statement of Emily Wiggins lend strong credence to placing the camp of the 42^nd Indiana somewhere near the Wiggins farm on the night of the November 30, 1864.

 There are other possible connections between the Wiggins family and the 42nd Indiana. One possible connection is with two soldiers from the 42nd Indiana with family names related to Sarah Wiggins. First, there is a Private Roger Barber from Company C of the 42nd. Barber was Sarah Wiggins’ maiden name. There is some question from the official records as to whether Private Barber would have been present for duty during the period his unit passed through the Wiggins family. In Company A of the 42nd there was a soldier named Corporal Benjamin Street. Street was the name of Sarah Wiggins’ uncle who left land and/or property to Sarah in his 1846 will. Corporal Street appears to have been present for duty during the last week of November 1864. The only possible connection to these two soldiers is the name relationship. However, it does seem to be an intriguing possibility that these were distant relatives or that some connection was formed due to the names.

There are other possible units that may have encountered the Wiggins clan although the evidence is speculative. Lieutenant Platter (81st Ohio) also has a fascinating entry into his diary for the November 30th that may or may not refer to the Wiggins family:

Left camp at 6 o clock – a very foggy morning – but the mist soon cleared away and we had a most beautiful day. The first 10 mile of our way lay through the pine barrens”. And during that whole distance only one log hut greeted our vision and that was inhabited by a “love lone widder” with six tow headed children” Passed through Summerville a country town which presented rather a pleasing appearance.[xvi]

The 81^st Ohio was assigned to the 2^nd Brigade, 4^th Division, 15^th Corps. As mentioned earlier, this unit would have passed very near the Wiggins farm. Even though this diary entry is for the 30^th of November, it is possible that some of the 4^th Division units may not have made it as far as Sommerville (Summertown) on the 29^th.

In the end analysis, I believe Sarah Wiggins sent George into the North Prong Creek swamp with some of the family’s livestock and other items prior to the arrival of the first Union army units on November 29, 1864. Sarah likely found out about the approaching army several days in advance from neighbors as the word spread. She may have had additional warning from Confederate troopers passing through the area. Units from the 2^nd and/or 4^th Divisions of the 15^th Corps arrived at the Wiggins plantation during the afternoon of the 29^th. They are likely to have plundered at least some items from the farm. About 24 hours later, Gideon Kellams and his regiment appeared with 1900 head of cattle at the Wiggins farm. The fields offered a good place to round up the cattle for the night, so the 42^nd Indiana camped on the Wiggins farm on the night of the 30^th.

Additionally, I believe that Captain Kellams (and possibly his staff) may have been a guest of the family that evening at which time Sarah asked for his assistance in escaping the possible retribution sure to come against her after the Union army departed. It’s likely that Kellams explained the slowness of the cattle and the danger from Confederate forces making an extremely early departure necessary. He probably insisted that Sarah and her children join the encampment for the evening so that they could depart with the regiment at an early hour. The family was not likely seen by most soldiers in the regiment until the following day. This explains why William H. McCleary’s diary annotation about “ladys” first appears on the 1^st of December.

Union General Smith D. Atkins to a woman in South Carolina

Researchers and historians continue to ponder the question of the conduct of Sherman’s soldiers during the march. Many Southerners, to this day, maintain that it was an orgy of rape, pillage, and plunder aimed at not just winning the war, but at disgracing the white southerner’s way of life. Historians generally believe that incidents involving capital crimes were rare during the march especially assaults on white women. In fact, according to military records, no formal charges of rape were filed against any member of Sherman’s army during the march through Georgia. This is not to say that rape against white women didn’t occur.

Although not formally reported, historians have generally identified two or three cases that may have taken place. One of the most infamous and likely the only one that Sarah Wiggins may have been aware of prior to the army’s arrival occurred near Milledgeville. Allegedly, two Union soldiers raped Mrs. Kate Nichols whose husband was away serving in the Confederate army. Soon afterward, the story was broadcast throughout the countryside and even made its way into the newspapers.[i]

Whatever else it may have been, it was one of the most unusual operations of any army in the history of warfare.  Sherman’s “bummers” were a unique group of soldiers:

The pillaging by soldiers in the main columns created an army unlike any other in American history. Hams and vegetables were strung around necks and moved rhythmically when the encumbered men walked. Chickens, both dead and alive, where everywhere, under arms, around necks, in makeshift cages, and dragged along the ground. Knapsacks and baskets overflowing with produce and other booty weighted heavily on marching shoulders. As the army moved forward, soldiers got tired of carrying extra weight and threw off the less appealing spoils, so that the roadsides became cluttered with refuse. Broken down horses and mules were summarily shot and replaced with better stock. The stink from decayed vegetables and animals was sometimes overwhelming.[ii]

It is certainly true that there were numerous incidents where civilians were clean out of all possessions without regard to military value. Sherman issued orders that specified an orderly process for gathering provisions from the countryside with a brigade-size party of about 50 men. This party was normally led by a Captain who served as one of the company commanders within the Brigade. This foraging party would often, by necessity of movement and effectiveness, split into smaller groups in order to cover more plantations in a shorter period of time. In a post-war account of his experiences, Captain R.W. Burt of Company H, 76^th Ohio Infantry Regiment, explained the operation of the typical foraging party in the 15^th Corps:

In order to procure the needed supplies for our brigade, such as cattle, hogs, sheep, mules, and horses and also bacon, sweet potatoes, chickens, turkeys, geese, etc., the foragers had to strike off on by-roads leading to plantations, and sometimes found themselves five or six miles from the marching column. Small squads would frequently be sent to houses away from the road across the fields, so that in the course of the day the foraging party would be reduced to half the number it started out with in the morning… Sometimes we would reach a plantation just at night, and so far away that we could not reach the column, and would have to bivouac and place men on guard to avoid surprise and possible capture. It was risky, but fortunately the enemy never found out our exposed situation at night.

In clear contradiction of Sherman’s order, many units continuously sent out independent parties of foragers. Most of these parties operated outside the control of the unit’s officers, but with unspoken approval from any officer that had specific knowledge of it. Once the party had departed the main unit, control over the movement and conduct of these parties would be difficult at best. The problem of command and control served as a convenient excuse for the officers to turn a blind eye to these small, independent groups of soldiers. Officers commonly allowed this process to run its course as long as the men were back in camp by dark and they willing shared the harvest with other soldiers in the unit. Failure to share the loot with others or withholding certain prized items would provoke an outcry from the other soldiers in the unit.

As frequently reported during Sherman’s march through Georgia, these foragers would take anything and everything they could put their hands on and haul away with them. Sarah Wiggins’ statement to the SCC tells of the family’s horse and buggy being stuffed with pigs and chickens as a Union soldier drove it away from the plantation. Often, these looted items where of no value to the army or the individual soldiers who took them from the plantations.

Whether official sanctioned or not, the foragers were highly skilled at their craft. By General Sherman’s own admission in his memoirs, his foragers were a very effective force for supplying his army with fresh food. He describes the modus operandi for his foragers:

The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one of the features of this march. Each brigade commander had authority to detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with one or two commissioned officers selected for their boldness and enterprise. This party would be dispatched before daylight with a knowledge of the intended day’s march and camp; would proceed on foot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade, and then visit every plantation and farm within range. They would usually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon, corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and everything that could be used as food or forage, and would then regain the main road, usually in advance of their train. When this came up, they would deliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by the way.[iii]

Oftentimes, the actions of the foraging parties would border on the laughable side. Both the seemingly undisciplined troops from Western regiments and those regiments from the Eastern states made the task of living off the land a sport. There was almost a sense of competition as the parties would strive to return with both the best quality and quantity that the farms of Georgia had to offer. One officer from the 2^nd Massachusetts Volunteers described the daily work of the bummers:

Cock-fighting became one of the pastimes of the “flying column.” Many fine birds were brought in by our foragers. Those found deficient in courage and skill quickly went to the stew-pan in company with the modest barn-yard fowl, but those of redoubtable valor won an honored place and name, and were to be seen riding proudly on the front seat of an artillery caisson, or carried tenderly under the arm of an infantry soldier.[iv]

The general characterization of these bummers by some Southerners as an out of control group of plunderers and rapists didn’t set well with General Sherman. The general took great pride in the work of his army as it moved across Georgia and resented the misrepresentation of the activities of his soldiers. Writing in his autobiography, Sherman strongly disagreed with the southern newspapers portrayal of his army’s behavior.

Before I had reached Savannah, and daring our stay there, the rebel officers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of our army as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex; that we burned every thing we came across–barns, stables, cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the women and killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on the inhabitants. Therefore it struck me as strange that Generals Hardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, and even bespeak our personal care and attention. These officers knew well that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yet tacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the drooping energies of the people of the South.[v]   

However, the general also seemed to understand that it was impossible for him to fully comprehend the scope of activities carried out by his 60,000 soldiers. Sherman seems to contradict himself earlier in his memoirs as he admits to the possibility of some less than soldierly acts by his “bummers.”

No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery and violence were committed by these parties of foragers, usually called “bummers;” for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder of articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were exceptional and incidental. No army could have carried along sufficient food and forage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in some shape was necessary. By it our men were well supplied with all the essentials of life and health, while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, and our animals were well fed. Indeed, when we reached Savannah, the trains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh and appearance ever seen with any army.[vi]

Sherman seems to be purposefully vague about the possibility that his troops may have committed these acts except to label them as “exceptional and incidental.” He viewed any acts of violence against the citizenry of Georgia as a necessary byproduct of the efforts to keep his army supplied during the march. For Sherman, this apparently fell into his “war is hell” category where some collateral damage to the citizenry was unavoidable in times of war. Most reputable scholars agree that these “high crimes” were the exception and not the rule for Sherman’s troops. In any case, the economic impact was enormous for Georgia approaching $100 million in losses by Sherman’s own estimation.[vii]

Many Southern men whose homes were in the path of the blue storm were certainly trusting of the Union soldiers. Numerous incidents exist where the man of the house fled before the approaching Union army leaving his wife and children to face the soldiers. Many times, the man left a letter for the Union army asking for protection for his wife and family. This was especially true when the head of the family was an officer in the Confederate service. Obviously, most of these men would not have left their families without some expectation that the Union army would treat the women and children with the appropriate dignity and respect.

In contrast to the “exceptional and incidental” criminal acts that may have been committed by a few soldiers, there were efforts to limit the impact of the foraging army. At least one of Sherman’s Corps Commanders, Maj. Gen. Osterhaus, commanding general of the 15^th Corps, attempted to put a halt to some of the suspected abuses by the foragers albeit a bit too late to help the Wiggins family save their goods. Interestingly enough, units from the 15^th Corps were likely the first Union soldiers to encounter the Wiggins family on November 29^th. On the day after the Wiggins family’s encounter with the Union soldiers, Maj. Gen. Osterhaus, issued Special Order number 187 from his headquarters south of the OgeecheeRiver near Millen, Georgia. It read, in part:

The attention of division commanders and commanding officers of detachments is called to the irregularities existing in foraging and the manner in which this privilege is often abused. It is noticed that many men not belong to proper foraging parties are allowed to straggle from the ranks and forage for themselves, without any authority whatever. It is by such men that the greater part of the pillaging is done and depredations committed, of which there is so much complaint. Officers in charge of foraging parties must be continually instructed to keep their men well in hand, never allowing them to precede the advance guard of the column; and to use more discretion in taking from the poor, being careful to leave them sufficient for their immediate subsistence.[viii]

Note that Osterhaus gave particular attention to the plight of the poor of Georgia instructing his soldiers to leave “them sufficient for their immediate subsistence.”[ix]  This is likely in response to the army’s encounter with an increasing number of less prosperous farming operations many of whom owned few, if any, slaves. Based on the records of the march and diaries of the soldiers, a greater number of these farms were encountered as the army moved closer to Savannah. Even though the farms were smaller with less capital, human and otherwise, the farms were nonetheless productive allowing the Union soldiers to continue their general’s policy of “foraging liberally.” The Wiggins family would certainly fall into this category.

For the Wiggins family, a central question remains concerning how many of the family assets George Wiggins was able to hide in the swamps of the North Prong Creek.  If the listing on the SCC reflects something close to the total farm assets, some portion of the livestock listed may have been taken into the swamp by George.  However, if Sarah Wiggins was accurate in listing only the items taken by the Union soldiers, the family would have been even more prosperous than the SCC property listing indicates.  Given the realization that would have been required to survive on their own for a period of at least five months (including three months of winter), some significant numbers of livestock and other supplies or produce must have been hidden. This would also be supported by McCleary’s “desolate families” comment. It stands to reason that even after the army had moved out of EmanuelCounty enroute to Savannah, George would have been required to provide for himself until his father returned from service in the Confederate army at the Columbus, Georgia Quartermaster Depot. However, with the assets that he had likely carried into the Prong Creek swamp with him, George would have been able to survive through the winter months. 

As mentioned earlier, the absence of milk cows, mules and a wagon from the SCC claim support the assertion that George may have been well supplied to face the remaining winter months alone at the Wiggins plantation. Since George had been effectively functioning as the head of the household for the past 2 years, his experience would serve him well in planning to sustain himself alone on the farm.

Proverbs 20:29

Based on Confederate Army records, we know that John was present for duty at Columbus through the end of February 1865.  Since the depot continued to function until the end of the war in April 1865, it is likely that he did not return to Blun until at least late April of 1865. In fact, the depot was involved in the last major land battles in the east as the Union soldiers attacked Columbus in late April of 1865.

On Easter Sunday, April 16, 1865, a Union force of three divisions under the command of Major General James Harrison Wilson attacked the Confederates defending Columbus. The Confederate forces, commanded by Major General Howell Cobb, totaled about 3,000 soldiers including many pulled from the depot. After initially being repulsed by the Confederates, the Union troops mounted a highly unusual night attack across the 14^th Street Bridge. This attack was successful and Columbus fell ending the last major land battle of the Civil War.[i] There is a strong possibility that John Wiggins would have been among the defenders that day. 

John M. Wiggins enlisted in the Confederate Army as a private with Company A of the 3rd Georgia Volunteer Infantry (Burke Guards) on October 10, 1862. The 3^rd Georgia was organized in April of 1861 and in the spring of 1862 was assigned to the Army of Northern Virginia where it played a key role in numerous battles including Sharpsburg, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor and the surrender at Appomattox Court House in April 1865.

Whether John Wiggins’ enlistment was a result of Southern patriotic fervor or purely financial considerations is not known. However, at his advanced age of 51, he was certainly under no obligation to serve. He enlisted as a substitute for Jonathan Lewis, a member of one of BurkeCounty’s influential families.  

Not only was John Wiggins under no legal obligation to serve in the Confederate army, he was also not in the best physical condition to live the life of an infantry soldier. According to his service records, John was detailed to the Confederate Quartermaster Department with duty at Columbus in early December of 1862 due to a disability associated with his age. His duty at the Columbus Depot was listed as making shoes. Since John Wiggins listed his profession as blacksmith in the 1850 and 1860 censuses, our family had always assumed that he would have been employed at the depot using his skills. However, it appears that he was actually making shoes for soldiers, not horses, as listed in his official records from the Confederate Army. The Depot in Columbus functioned as a manufacturer of uniforms and associated items such as shoes for the Confederate army. The Savannah Republican newspaper reported on the total contributions of this depot to the Confederate war effort for the period October 1861 through May 1864:

Work Done in Columbus.—The Columbus Sun states that in the quartermaster’s department in that city, under the control of Major F. W. Dillard, the following amount of work has been done since October, 1861:  Shoes, 305,065; jackets, 263,922; pants,  290,092; shirts, 116,146; drawers, 82,948; caps, 122,441, also amount of leather received and disbursed, 682,577 lbs.[iv] 

The rolls for various times throughout the next two years confirm Private Wiggins as being present for his detail duty at Columbus. One can only imagine that John Wiggins may have been given a supervisory role at the depot because of his age, experience, and physical condition. The roll of the 3rd GVI for February 28, 1865, the last on file, shows him on detail duty in Quartermaster Department in Columbus, Georgia.

How did John Wiggins manage to join the Confederate Army as such an advanced age? It would seem that John could have avoided service due to his age. As mentioned earlier, he was under no obligation to join and fight for the Confederacy. Recruiting and processing soldier candidates for service in the armies of the Confederacy was an inexact science at best. Many of the surgeons assigned to screen new recruits for service were not trained or prepared to weed out those who should have been disqualified for medical reasons. Factors such as advanced age could be overlooked if the recruit was otherwise in good health.

Based on the available evidence, my best theory is that John Wiggins used his pre-war business association with the original commander of the 3rd GVI, Colonel Ambrose Ransom Wright, to influence his enlistment. The fact of their prior business relationship is attested to by several legal documents from both Burke and Emanuel counties involving the buying and selling of land. It is likely that he was able to obtain the arrangement for joining the 3^rd GVI through his prewar connections with the Colonel (later General) Wright.

Wright was definitely a man of considerable influence and it is likely that he would have had no trouble in overcoming the bureaucratic obstacles to enlistment that John Wiggins might have faced. He was born in Louisville, Georgia on April 26, 1826. Wright was a lawyer who was heavily involved in Georgia politics and his brother-in-law was governor of Georgia. During the run-up to the war, he served as a member of the Confederate delegation that attempted unsuccessfully to convince Maryland to secede from the Union. He also served as a delegate from Georgia to the Confederate Provisional Congress. After initially serving as the commander of the 3rd Georgia, Wright was promoted to brigadier general commanding a brigade and leading troops in the numerous battles of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. He was wounded at during the battle of Antietam in Sharpsburg, Maryland. It was only a few weeks after this battle that John Wiggins joined the 3rd Georgia. During the battle of Gettysburg, General Wright lead his brigade to what many believe to have been the “high watermark” of the Confederacy during the second day of fighting. Wright was later promoted to major general and assigned to Georgia to command units there until the end of the war. When the Civil War ended, he returned to his legal practice and expanded his business interests into newspapers by obtaining the Augusta “Chronicle and Sentinel.” After losing the 1871 election to the U.S. Senate, Wright finally obtained success in political life on the national level by being elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1872. However, he died in Augusta, Georgia on December 21, 1872 before he could take his seat in the House.[v]