From charred Atlanta marching, they launched the sword again.
“The March to the Sea” by Herman Melville (December 1864)
It was a cold late fall day in 1864 as Sarah Barber Wiggins stood on her front porch and stared toward the road only 200 yards away. She strained to hear the imagined, distance sound of horse hooves and soldiers’ boots striking the ground. Sarah cast her gaze over the tops of the tall Georgia pines hoping to catch a glimpse of the dust cloud that was sure to be rising from pounding of shoe leather and horse shoe iron against the dry, sandy loom soil of the Emanuel County roads. She knew they were coming and she now knew what she had to do. The matriarch of the Wiggins family swore silently before God to do whatever necessary to preserve her family and farm. George, her oldest son at 14, stood beside her with a tight grip on his father’s double barrel shotgun. Since his father left to join the Confederate Army more than two years earlier, George had taken on the role as the man of the house and protector of the family. Now, as the marauding army approached, he was bound and determined that no Yankee soldier would set foot near the Wiggins “plantation” as his mother like to refer to their 700 acre farm just a few miles south of Summerville. In the coming days, George’s bravado would fade away just like the Confederate army before Sherman’s marching horde. Indeed, there were difficult days were just ahead for all of the Wiggins clan.
It is difficult to be sure that this is an accurate opening paragraph story of the Wiggins family as it relates to the events of late November 1864 and early December 1864. There are many uncertainties in this intriguing story, but there are also some facts that can be known. One element of the account stands clear, that of one woman’s drive and determination to save family and farm at all costs. Sarah Wiggins was a woman bent on preserving both family and farm. It is undoubtedly possible that the events of these days transpired in a manner similar to the narrative above.
The story of the Wiggins family’s encounter with the army of William T. Sherman is a curious blend of fact and fiction; courage and deceit. On the one hand, the Wiggins family members seem to be the hapless victims of a portion of those 60,000 Federal troops moving rapidly through the Georgia countryside from Atlanta to Savannah. This was a grand army of Union troops sowing a sixty mile wide path of devastation and destruction across the state. The Wiggins’ family and farm were simply caught in the path of the storm as helpless victims.
Conversely, Sarah Wiggins gives the impression through her statements and actions that she is the sly and clever protector of her family and farm. She preserves both by fooling the Yankee troops to believe they have discovered a family of Union loyalists willing to assist them in their crusade through the pine barrens of central Georgia on their way to the coast. After gladly giving all her possessions to support the troops, Sarah appeals to the leaders to spare her and her family from the anti-Unionist backlash sure to come upon the departure of Sherman’s forces.
Whatever the real truth of the encounter, the quest to solve the mysteries of the story is appealing to even the casual history buff. It is a complicated mix of historical facts and family legend that is difficult to turn away from but is also sometimes too complex to fully understand.
John Wiggins’ background prior to the relocation to EmanuelCounty is somewhat short on details in the historical record. He is believed to have been born the son of a wealthy plantation owner in Burke County, Georgia named Amos Wiggins. Amos Wiggins was the owner and operator of a large plantation in northern BurkeCounty situated along Brier Creek. Records reveal that he was among the largest land and slave owners in BurkeCounty and the state of Georgia. We do know that John married Luraney Seago, the daughter of William Seago and Rebecca Cartledge, sometime prior to 1835, likely in BurkeCounty, Georgia. The marriage produced two children, Janet Middleton and Amos P. Wiggins, before ending in divorce sometime during the period 1837 to 1839. Around 1839, John married Sarah E. Barber, the daughter of Holden Barber originally from Jefferson County, Georgia. It is believed that John’s mother and brother may have excluded him from the division of property after the death of his father due to the scandal surrounding his divorce from Luraney Seago. This is supported by his sudden relocation to EmanuelCounty.
The Wiggins family moved from an unknown location in BurkeCounty to the 700 acre farm (or plantation, as Sarah referred to it) in northern EmanuelCounty around 1849 just prior to the birth of their oldest son, George, in December of that year. The property was situated three miles south of Summertown in the modern-day community of Blun. There remain many questions surrounding the acquisition of this property. In her claim to the SCC, Sarah asserts that she inherited the land from her uncle, Thomas Street, of JeffersonCounty.[i] However, it appears that there may have been some type of prior legal arrangements made between Thomas Barber, Sarah’s brother and appointed trustee (from the will of their uncle Thomas Street) and John Wiggins. Additionally, other legal documents support that John Wiggins made an outright purchase of the property.
Whatever the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the “plantation,” there is no doubt as to the location. In her statement to the Southern Claims Commission, Sarah gives the location of the farm as “about nine miles from Station No. 9 ½” on the Georgia Central Railroad. Station number 9 ½ was situated in the modern-day town of Midville (known as Barton at that time) just over the Ogeechee River from Emanuel County in Burke County. In fact, it is exactly nine miles from Midville to the center of Blun traveling south on Georgia Highway 56 (which follows the approximate route of the 19th century road running through Blun from Midville to Swainsboro).
In the days leading up to the encounter, the Wiggins family likely conducted preparations in anticipation of the arrival of these Union troops. Despite their somewhat isolated location in northern EmanuelCounty, news of the approaching would have reached them through neighbors or possibly from Confederate soldiers moving just ahead of Sherman’s forces. General Joseph Wheeler, commanding the Confederate cavalry charged with delaying the advance of Sherman’s troops, had instructed his subordinate commanders to warn all citizens in the path of Sherman’s storm. The citizens were to hide and/or destroy anything of potential value to the Union army. On November 15, 1864, Wheeler published these instructions from his Corps Headquarters:
All horses, mules, and other stock which citizens have left on the enemy’s line of march will be driven off and proper receipts left for the same. When no owner can be found, accurate, accounts will be kept, so that the stock can be reclaimed by the owner. Commanders of troops in falling back before the enemy will send reliable officers and men at least on day in advance to instruct citizens in which direction to drive their stock.[ii]
From the operational reports of General Wheeler, it isn’t possible to determine if the Confederate Cavalry actually passed by the Wiggins farm. However, it would seem that if Fighting Joe’s troopers did visit, they left the farm intact which was not the norm for Confederate Cavalry operations in advance of Sherman’s March. In fact, the cavalry troopers under Wheeler’s command gain an infamous reputation for visiting the families of Georgia even before Sherman began his march from Atlanta. The problem of pilfering the goods of Georgia farms was brought to the attention of the highest ranking Confederate commander in the state. General Hood had hardly assumed command when he published Field Order No. 14 which read in part:
The lawless seizure and destruction of private property by straggling soldiers in the rear and on the flanks of this army has become intolerable. It must come to an end. It is believed to be chargeable to worthless men, especially from mounted commands, who are odious alike to the citizen and the well-disposed soldier. Citizens and soldiers are, therefore, called upon to arrest and forward to the provost-marshal-general all persons guilty of wanton destruction or illegal seizure of property, that examples may be immediately made. The laws of war justify the execution of such offenders, and those laws shall govern.[iii]
Even if the mounted soldiers didn’t visit the farm, information from General Wheeler’s passing troops would have made it to the Wiggins family via their neighbors. Wheeler’s larger concern during the period was the Union cavalry’s threat against Augusta, so it is likely that the bulk of his force operated north of the OgeecheeRiver during this time.
As the word had come that General Sherman’s Army was beginning its march from the smoking ruins of the city of Atlanta, the families of Georgia pondered the direction of movement for the army. Word of the march spread through Georgia like wildfire as “Uncle Billy’s” troops began to move to the east and south. The Wiggins family may well have read the reports from a Savannah or Augusta newspaper regarding the approaching horde of blue. Some news reports, such as this one sent from Milledgeville, Georgia on November 27, 1864, described the impending threat the safety and well-being of the good citizens of Georgia:
We hear of a great many private dwellings, gin houses, and much cotton being burnt by the army on their different routes; some within sight. Also, that several private citizens were shot.[iv]
Many of the white women of Georgia were appreciably terrified by the tales of rape, pillage and plunder at the hands of Sherman’s soldiers. As Henry Hitchcock, one of Sherman’s staff officers remembers the words of a lady along the march that the soldiers were “killing everybody and burning every house.”[v] The tales, both true and false, of Sherman’s operations in north Georgia and the areas surrounding Atlanta created a great anxiety amongst the population. Some families choose to abandon their property becoming refugees heading to areas of the state they believed to be safe from the path of Sherman’s March. Certainly, the people of all social standings lying in the path of Sherman’s march were, at the least, apprehensive and, at the worst, panicked concerning their future.
It is impossible to know Sarah Wiggins’ level of understanding about what lay in store for her family. It is likely that Sarah understood the threat represented by Sherman’s army and, knowing this, she led the Wiggins family in making appropriate preparations for General Sherman’s arrival in late November of 1864. One can certainly speculate rather accurately on the events of those final days before the army’s arrival based on the existing historical record and first-hand accounts. The sense of a coming apocalyptic storm was apparently present across the farms and plantations of Georgia. Newspaper accounts such as the one in the Savannah Republican were commonplace as Sherman’s force of over 60,000 soldiers moved through Georgia.
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In March of 1864, as the Civil War began its fourth and final year, Major General William T. Sherman assumed command of the Federal Division of the Mississippi. This followed a dramatic victory by Union forces at the Battle of Chattanooga in November of 1864 and General Grant’s promotion to General-in-Chief of all Union armies. With the capture of Chattanooga, known as the “Gateway of the South” Sherman was able to prepare for an offensive in northern Georgia for the following spring. During this spring offensive, Sherman’s army was highly successful in cutting a path from Chattanooga to the outskirts of Atlanta. By July 1864, Sherman began a push around the Confederate defenses approaching Atlanta and, eventually, Confederate General Joseph Johnston withdrew his forces to the confines of the city to begin a deliberate defense of the city.
Atlanta was a key industrial and transportation center for the Confederacy situated in the heart of the southern states and often referred to as the second capital of the Confederate States of America despite the fact that Atlanta had never served as the capital city of its own state. Sherman realized that it was imperative for his army to capture Atlanta, denying the Confederates access to the resources of the city, if his campaign was to be considered successful. There were also high political stakes riding on Sherman’s success or failure. The successful capture of Atlanta would provide a much needed boast to Abraham Lincoln’s reelection bid against the former Army of the Potomac commander and peace Democrat, George B. McClellan.
Johnston, who was known for a more cautious approach, failed to aggressively attack Sherman’s forces as ordered by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. General Johnston preferred to remain in a defensive posture and closely adhere to his philosophy of preserving the army to fight another day. This was a constant source of disagreement between the general and the president. Johnson’s refusal to attack was not taken lightly by the Confederate president who insisted on defending key southern cities by forcefully attacking the enemy no matter the cost in men and materiel. In July of 1864, President Davis had heard enough of the excuses and conflicting strategies. He relieved Johnston of command for his failure to attack Sherman replacing him with General John Bell Hood of Kentucky. Hood was a general referred to by Robert E. Lee as a “good fighter, very industrious on the battlefield.” During the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Hood was a key player while serving as a division commander under Longstreet. At the beginning of the assault, Hood was wounded by an artillery shell exploding over his head. The exploding shell severely damaged his left arm which he was unable to make use of it for the rest of his life.
After convalescing for many weeks in Richmond, Hood returned to division command under Longstreet at the battle of Chickamauga in September of 1863. His aggressive action broke the Federal line and enabled the Confederate forces to win the battle. However, Hood was again severely wounded during the fighting losing his right leg. Again, he recovered in Richmond, this time becoming friends with Jefferson Davis.
By the summer of 1864, Hood was ready to answer Davis’ call for him to return to the fight as the commander of the forces facing Sherman’s Army. However, the fate of the Confederate army in Atlanta was sealed even before Hood’s rise to command.
Hood did not disappoint Jefferson Davis as he aggressively attacked Sherman’s army at various points around Atlanta. His enthusiasm for battle did not match his success against Sherman’s well equipped, battle hardened veterans. Hood launched four major offensives during the summer with high causalities, all of which failed to break Sherman’s pressure on Atlanta. General Hood had no other choice now but to attempt to persevere his army.
On the first day of September 1864, after six weeks in command, General Hood abandoned the defensive works guarding Atlanta against the Union forces and, eventually, moved the preponderance of his army to the north. For the majority of the Confederate troops under Hood’s command, they had seen the last of William T. Sherman. By evacuating Atlanta’s defenses and moving north, General Hood left open the door of the city and gave up the remaining stronghold of industrial and logistical might for the Confederacy. Atlanta would now receive the wrath of the occupying Union forces under Sherman.
Although Sherman’s forces quickly occupied the city, the general knew that it was only a matter of time before the rebel troops would rebound and begin to reorganize in preparation for conducting offensive operations against his army. Understanding the likely actions of the Confederate Army, Sherman devised a controversial plan to first evacuate all civilians from the city of Atlanta which he had declared to be a military post and then have one element of his force move to attack the retreating Confederate army to the north. Upon successful execution of his plan, Sherman’s army would significantly reduce the threat posed by the Confederate forces under Hood drawing him away from the intended Union line of march with a force under Union General George Thomas. Hood offensive against Sherman’s Line of Communication from Atlanta to Chattanooga provided the opening for Thomas to give chase.
In November, as Sherman evacuated the city, he ordered all “militarily significant” structures to be put to the torch. As would happen later in Columbia, South Carolina, the fire spread beyond these structures and burned many non-military structures as well giving rise to the tale that Sherman had deliberately burned Atlanta to the ground. Although Sherman hadn’t ordered the complete destruction of the city, the results of the fire were devastating for the second most important city in the Confederacy.
As for Sherman’s thoughts on the burning of Atlanta, it seems to have been written off as collateral damage which might have been avoided altogether if not for the rebellious attitudes of the southern citizens. Sherman’s primary concern centered on winning the war as quickly as possible in order to restore the Union. To accomplish this objective required not only defeating the Confederate forces at hand, but eliminating the southern states means of supporting the war effort. The by-product of this endeavor would be tremendous privation and suffering for the people of Georgia. The General’s thoughts on the effects of war upon the population are evidenced in his forthright response to the appeals of the mayor and city council of Atlanta concerning the evacuation of the city prior to the fire:
You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against the terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.[vi]
With the shattered, smoking remains of a mostly vacant Atlanta behind him, it was time for “Cump” Sherman to progress to the next phase of his grand strategic plan. Promising President Lincoln and General-in-Chief Grant that he could “make Georgia howl,” Sherman’s army began its “March to the Sea” from Atlanta in November of 1864. Sherman opined that “until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses and people will cripple their military resources… I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.”[vii]
Sherman’s plan to destroy the remaining logistical infrastructure of the state of Georgia was intended to deny resources to the Confederate soldiers in the field and to break the popular will of the people of the southern states. Sherman wanted to demonstrate that for the Confederacy to continue the war was futile and that the citizens of the south would pay a great price for supporting the war effort. Further, he intended to prove that a Union army could move freely about the Confederate states without any serious hindrance from southern forces. Sherman planned to supply his army from the “fat” of the land until he was able to establish a sea-based resupply operation using the ports in and around Savannah. The “fat” of the land would include many of the farms throughout central and south Georgia like the Wiggins farm.
To his credit, Sherman had carefully studied pre-war records as to the ability of the Georgia heartland to support his army and how the people might react to the presence of his army. He also drew of his knowledge of the terrain, culture and people gained during a tour through the state as a young Army lieutenant. Based on his familiarity and experience, Sherman was so confident in the ability of his army to live off the land that he wrote his wife, Ellen, prior to the march, “We won’t starve in Georgia.” [viii]
The general realized that the success of his plan was dependent upon keeping the army in motion toward the final destination. To slow or stop the army would quickly deplete the available resources and allow the enemy to conduct a deliberate attack. As a key part of his plan for the march, Sherman maintained an amazingly high level of operational security as to his final objective for the push through Georgia. He kept the few observers from the Confederate army confused as to his true intentions upon departing Atlanta. In fact, Confederate military and political leaders were kept in a great state of confusion as Sherman’s Left Wing made a feint toward Augusta and the Right Wing moved toward Macon. For several weeks, the commanders of the opposing Confederate forces believed Sherman would attack Macon, Augusta, or both. This meant that state and Confederate
troops were never able to mass in one location bringing unified opposition against the Union army. For an army with too few soldiers to start with, assembling, organizing and moving with an army capable of stopping the march would be impossible. As Sherman would later write in his memories, his objective for the campaign was “to place my army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his forces to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston.”[ix]
Not until several weeks into the movement of Federal troops did Confederate commanders and Georgia’s political leaders realize Sherman’s true intention of capturing the city of Savannah and establishing contact with the Federal Navy along the Georgia coast. The meager forces available to the Confederates to defend Georgia were divided between Macon, Augusta and Savannah. By the time Confederate leaders understood that Sherman was committing his forces to march to the coast, little could be done to stop him from attacking and securing the port of Savannah.
Recognizing that the march would require speed and maneuver never before demonstrated in the history of warfare, Sherman issued orders to his troops to take freely any supplies needed to sustain their march. He acknowledged that he would not allow his army to be hindered with the burden of maintaining long lines of supply in the rear of the army. It would be necessary to break contact with his supply base in Atlanta as he moved to the Atlantic Ocean. Although his orders contain instructions to forge “liberally on the country,” Sherman’s order also describes a systematic plan with specific directions for gathering the needed materiel to sustain his army on the move.
General Sherman’s order of November 9, 1864 reads as follows:
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
in the Field, Kingston, Georgia, November 9, 1864
1. For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided into two wings, viz.:
The right wing, Major-General O.O. Howard, commanding, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, major-General H.W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.
2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.
3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 a.m., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.
4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days’ provisions for his command, and three days’ forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging-parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled.
5. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.
6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging-parties may also take mules or horses, to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules for the regiments of brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, given written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.
7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and this his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.
8. The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, composed if possible of Negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practise the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.
9. Captain O.M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and the commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at all times.
By order of Major-General W.T. Sherman,L. M. Dayton, Aide-de-Camp.
Within a few weeks of departing the confines of Atlanta, the two corps of General Oliver O. Howard, operating as the Right Wing of Sherman’s Army, was approaching EmanuelCounty on their infamous “March to the Sea.”
The Union Army’s Order of Battle for the “March to the Sea”
Commanding General, Major General William T. Sherman
- RIGHT WING, Major General O. O. Howard.
- Fifteenth CORPS, Major General P. J. Osterhaus.
- DIVISIONS.
- Brig. Gen. C. R. Wood’s
- Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen’s
- Brig. Gen. J. E. Smith’s
- Brig. Gen. J. M. Corse’s
- DIVISIONS.
- Seventeenth CORPS, Frank P. Blair, Jr.
- DIVISIONS.
- Maj. Gen. J. A. Mower’s
- Brig. Gen. M. D. Leggett’s.
- Brig. Gen. G. A. Smith’s.
- DIVISIONS.
- Fifteenth CORPS, Major General P. J. Osterhaus.
- LEFT WING, Major General H. W. Slocum.
- Fourteenth CORPS, Brev. Major General Jeff. C. Davis
- DIVISIONS.
- Brig. Gen. W. P. Carlin’s.
- Brig. Gen. J. D. Morgan’s.
- Brig. Gen. A. Baird’s
- DIVISIONS.
- Twentieth CORPS, Brigadier General A. S. Williams.
- DIVISIONS.
- Brig. Gen. N. T. Jackson’s.
- Brig. Gen. J. W. Geary’s
- Brig. Gen. W. T. Ward’s.
- DIVISIONS.
- Fourteenth CORPS, Brev. Major General Jeff. C. Davis
- 3rd Cavalry Division, Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick
The Right Wing commander of Sherman’s Army, Oliver Otis Howard, was a career U.S. Army officer who as a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac suffered two humiliating defeats, first at Chancellorsville and later that year at Gettysburg. After these defeats, Howard was transferred to the Western theater where he found greater success as both a corps and army commander. In the Battle of Chattanooga, Howard led his corps in the assault that resulted in the capture of Missionary Ridge forcing the retreat of Confederate General Braxton Bragg. After Major General James McPherson was killed in the Battle of Atlanta, Howard was picked by Sherman as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. Selected to command the right wing of Sherman’s army on the March to the Sea, Howard continued in that role during the final campaign through the Carolinas in 1865.
General Howard is one of three Union officers mentioned by name in Sarah Wiggins’ claim before the Southern Claims Commission.[x] From the wording of her statement to the SCC, it is appears that Sarah and her children may have personally encountered Howard at some point after leaving her farm on the evening of November 30, 1864. According to the official reports and the testimony of Emily Wiggins before the Southern Claims Commission, General Howard’s Right Wing Headquarters was co-located with the 15th Corps Headquarters spending the night of November 30th on a plantation owned by John R. Wells. This plantation was located near the intersection of the Old Savannah Road and modern-day Georgia Highway 56.[xi]
Howard was known to many as the “Christian General.” He was deeply concerned about the plight of freed slaves and other persons displaced by the March to the Sea. General Howard was a well known humanitarian who would later be instrumental in the establishment of the Freedmen’s Bureau providing assistance for former slaves and other displaced southerners.
During the march through both Georgia and the Carolinas, Howard was known to receive many of the individuals seeking protection from the bummers of Sherman’s Army. He was also noted for providing relief for the suffering. For example, during the occupation
of Columbia, South Carolina, General Howard granted an audience to one German businessman who had suffered losses at the hands of Union soldiers. In a gesture of benevolence toward the man, Howard offered to take the offended man along with the army until they reach the coast. Once at a suitable seaport, Howard would ensure the man received transportation to the North or onward to Europe.[xiii]
Although we cannot be sure of Howard’s interaction with the Wiggins family, it would have certainly been within character for the general to offer assistance to Sarah and her children. This would be especially true if Sarah was thought to be a Union loyalist hoping to escape the post-invasion retribution of her Confederate neighbors. Also, Sherman’s General Order Number 119 issued on November 8, 1864 prior to the departure from Atlanta gave subordinate commanders some flexibility in dealing with citizens along the march who desired sanctuary with the army.
All surplus servants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those of the past.[xiv]
[ii] November 15, 1864 message from General Wheeler’s Corps Headquarters, The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XLIV, Reports and Correspondence , The Savannah Campaign.
[iv] Letter from a member of the Georgia Legislature published in the Savannah (Georgia) Republican, December 2, 1864
[v]M.A. DeWolfe Howe (ed.), Marching with Sherman: Passages from the Letters and Campaign Diaries of Henry Hitchcock, Major and assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers, November 1864-May 1865 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).
[vi] Major General W.T. Sherman’s letter to James M. Calhoun, Mayor, E.E. Rawson and S.C. Wells, representing City Council of Atlanta, dated September 12, 1864.
[vii]“Sherman‘s March to the Sea, November 15, 1864 – December 21, 1864.” DISCovering U.S. History. Gale Research, 1997. Reproduced in HistoryResourceCenter. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/HistRC/
[x] The other officers mentioned by Sarah Wiggins were Captain (later Colonel) Gideon Kellams, Commanding Officer of the 42nd Indiana Infantry Regiment and, of course, Major General Sherman.
