You know less then any woman I ever saw, but none of this will save you. Our forces are throughout your state. We’ll soon see the proud women of Carolina, like those of Georgia, with tears in their eyes begging crusts of bread from our men for their famishing children. Oh it was a Glorious Sight.
Union General Smith D. Atkins to a woman in South Carolina
Researchers and historians continue to ponder the question of the conduct of Sherman’s soldiers during the march. Many Southerners, to this day, maintain that it was an orgy of rape, pillage, and plunder aimed at not just winning the war, but at disgracing the white southerner’s way of life. Historians generally believe that incidents involving capital crimes were rare during the march especially assaults on white women. In fact, according to military records, no formal charges of rape were filed against any member of Sherman’s army during the march through Georgia. This is not to say that rape against white women didn’t occur.
Although not formally reported, historians have generally identified two or three cases that may have taken place. One of the most infamous and likely the only one that Sarah Wiggins may have been aware of prior to the army’s arrival occurred near Milledgeville. Allegedly, two Union soldiers raped Mrs. Kate Nichols whose husband was away serving in the Confederate army. Soon afterward, the story was broadcast throughout the countryside and even made its way into the newspapers.[i]
Whatever else it may have been, it was one of the most unusual operations of any army in the history of warfare. Sherman’s “bummers” were a unique group of soldiers:
The pillaging by soldiers in the main columns created an army unlike any other in American history. Hams and vegetables were strung around necks and moved rhythmically when the encumbered men walked. Chickens, both dead and alive, where everywhere, under arms, around necks, in makeshift cages, and dragged along the ground. Knapsacks and baskets overflowing with produce and other booty weighted heavily on marching shoulders. As the army moved forward, soldiers got tired of carrying extra weight and threw off the less appealing spoils, so that the roadsides became cluttered with refuse. Broken down horses and mules were summarily shot and replaced with better stock. The stink from decayed vegetables and animals was sometimes overwhelming.[ii]
It is certainly true that there were numerous incidents where civilians were clean out of all possessions without regard to military value. Sherman issued orders that specified an orderly process for gathering provisions from the countryside with a brigade-size party of about 50 men. This party was normally led by a Captain who served as one of the company commanders within the Brigade. This foraging party would often, by necessity of movement and effectiveness, split into smaller groups in order to cover more plantations in a shorter period of time. In a post-war account of his experiences, Captain R.W. Burt of Company H, 76th Ohio Infantry Regiment, explained the operation of the typical foraging party in the 15th Corps:
In order to procure the needed supplies for our brigade, such as cattle, hogs, sheep, mules, and horses and also bacon, sweet potatoes, chickens, turkeys, geese, etc., the foragers had to strike off on by-roads leading to plantations, and sometimes found themselves five or six miles from the marching column. Small squads would frequently be sent to houses away from the road across the fields, so that in the course of the day the foraging party would be reduced to half the number it started out with in the morning… Sometimes we would reach a plantation just at night, and so far away that we could not reach the column, and would have to bivouac and place men on guard to avoid surprise and possible capture. It was risky, but fortunately the enemy never found out our exposed situation at night.
In clear contradiction of Sherman’s order, many units continuously sent out independent parties of foragers. Most of these parties operated outside the control of the unit’s officers, but with unspoken approval from any officer that had specific knowledge of it. Once the party had departed the main unit, control over the movement and conduct of these parties would be difficult at best. The problem of command and control served as a convenient excuse for the officers to turn a blind eye to these small, independent groups of soldiers. Officers commonly allowed this process to run its course as long as the men were back in camp by dark and they willing shared the harvest with other soldiers in the unit. Failure to share the loot with others or withholding certain prized items would provoke an outcry from the other soldiers in the unit.
As frequently reported during Sherman’s march through Georgia, these foragers would take anything and everything they could put their hands on and haul away with them. Sarah Wiggins’ statement to the SCC tells of the family’s horse and buggy being stuffed with pigs and chickens as a Union soldier drove it away from the plantation. Often, these looted items where of no value to the army or the individual soldiers who took them from the plantations.
Whether official sanctioned or not, the foragers were highly skilled at their craft. By General Sherman’s own admission in his memoirs, his foragers were a very effective force for supplying his army with fresh food. He describes the modus operandi for his foragers:
The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one of the features of this march. Each brigade commander had authority to detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with one or two commissioned officers selected for their boldness and enterprise. This party would be dispatched before daylight with a knowledge of the intended day’s march and camp; would proceed on foot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade, and then visit every plantation and farm within range. They would usually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon, corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and everything that could be used as food or forage, and would then regain the main road, usually in advance of their train. When this came up, they would deliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by the way.[iii]
Oftentimes, the actions of the foraging parties would border on the laughable side. Both the seemingly undisciplined troops from Western regiments and those regiments from the Eastern states made the task of living off the land a sport. There was almost a sense of competition as the parties would strive to return with both the best quality and quantity that the farms of Georgia had to offer. One officer from the 2nd Massachusetts Volunteers described the daily work of the bummers:
Cock-fighting became one of the pastimes of the “flying column.” Many fine birds were brought in by our foragers. Those found deficient in courage and skill quickly went to the stew-pan in company with the modest barn-yard fowl, but those of redoubtable valor won an honored place and name, and were to be seen riding proudly on the front seat of an artillery caisson, or carried tenderly under the arm of an infantry soldier.[iv]
The general characterization of these bummers by some Southerners as an out of control group of plunderers and rapists didn’t set well with General Sherman. The general took great pride in the work of his army as it moved across Georgia and resented the misrepresentation of the activities of his soldiers. Writing in his autobiography, Sherman strongly disagreed with the southern newspapers portrayal of his army’s behavior.
Before I had reached Savannah, and daring our stay there, the rebel officers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of our army as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex; that we burned every thing we came across–barns, stables, cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the women and killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on the inhabitants. Therefore it struck me as strange that Generals Hardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, and even bespeak our personal care and attention. These officers knew well that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yet tacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the drooping energies of the people of the South.[v]
However, the general also seemed to understand that it was impossible for him to fully comprehend the scope of activities carried out by his 60,000 soldiers. Sherman seems to contradict himself earlier in his memoirs as he admits to the possibility of some less than soldierly acts by his “bummers.”
No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery and violence were committed by these parties of foragers, usually called “bummers;” for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder of articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were exceptional and incidental. No army could have carried along sufficient food and forage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in some shape was necessary. By it our men were well supplied with all the essentials of life and health, while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, and our animals were well fed. Indeed, when we reached Savannah, the trains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh and appearance ever seen with any army.[vi]
Sherman seems to be purposefully vague about the possibility that his troops may have committed these acts except to label them as “exceptional and incidental.” He viewed any acts of violence against the citizenry of Georgia as a necessary byproduct of the efforts to keep his army supplied during the march. For Sherman, this apparently fell into his “war is hell” category where some collateral damage to the citizenry was unavoidable in times of war. Most reputable scholars agree that these “high crimes” were the exception and not the rule for Sherman’s troops. In any case, the economic impact was enormous for Georgia approaching $100 million in losses by Sherman’s own estimation.[vii]
Many Southern men whose homes were in the path of the blue storm were certainly trusting of the Union soldiers. Numerous incidents exist where the man of the house fled before the approaching Union army leaving his wife and children to face the soldiers. Many times, the man left a letter for the Union army asking for protection for his wife and family. This was especially true when the head of the family was an officer in the Confederate service. Obviously, most of these men would not have left their families without some expectation that the Union army would treat the women and children with the appropriate dignity and respect.
In contrast to the “exceptional and incidental” criminal acts that may have been committed by a few soldiers, there were efforts to limit the impact of the foraging army. At least one of Sherman’s Corps Commanders, Maj. Gen. Osterhaus, commanding general of the 15th Corps, attempted to put a halt to some of the suspected abuses by the foragers albeit a bit too late to help the Wiggins family save their goods. Interestingly enough, units from the 15th Corps were likely the first Union soldiers to encounter the Wiggins family on November 29th. On the day after the Wiggins family’s encounter with the Union soldiers, Maj. Gen. Osterhaus, issued Special Order number 187 from his headquarters south of the OgeecheeRiver near Millen, Georgia. It read, in part:
The attention of division commanders and commanding officers of detachments is called to the irregularities existing in foraging and the manner in which this privilege is often abused. It is noticed that many men not belong to proper foraging parties are allowed to straggle from the ranks and forage for themselves, without any authority whatever. It is by such men that the greater part of the pillaging is done and depredations committed, of which there is so much complaint. Officers in charge of foraging parties must be continually instructed to keep their men well in hand, never allowing them to precede the advance guard of the column; and to use more discretion in taking from the poor, being careful to leave them sufficient for their immediate subsistence.[viii]
Note that Osterhaus gave particular attention to the plight of the poor of Georgia instructing his soldiers to leave “them sufficient for their immediate subsistence.”[ix] This is likely in response to the army’s encounter with an increasing number of less prosperous farming operations many of whom owned few, if any, slaves. Based on the records of the march and diaries of the soldiers, a greater number of these farms were encountered as the army moved closer to Savannah. Even though the farms were smaller with less capital, human and otherwise, the farms were nonetheless productive allowing the Union soldiers to continue their general’s policy of “foraging liberally.” The Wiggins family would certainly fall into this category.
For the Wiggins family, a central question remains concerning how many of the family assets George Wiggins was able to hide in the swamps of the North Prong Creek. If the listing on the SCC reflects something close to the total farm assets, some portion of the livestock listed may have been taken into the swamp by George. However, if Sarah Wiggins was accurate in listing only the items taken by the Union soldiers, the family would have been even more prosperous than the SCC property listing indicates. Given the realization that would have been required to survive on their own for a period of at least five months (including three months of winter), some significant numbers of livestock and other supplies or produce must have been hidden. This would also be supported by McCleary’s “desolate families” comment. It stands to reason that even after the army had moved out of EmanuelCounty enroute to Savannah, George would have been required to provide for himself until his father returned from service in the Confederate army at the Columbus, Georgia Quartermaster Depot. However, with the assets that he had likely carried into the Prong Creek swamp with him, George would have been able to survive through the winter months.
As mentioned earlier, the absence of milk cows, mules and a wagon from the SCC claim support the assertion that George may have been well supplied to face the remaining winter months alone at the Wiggins plantation. Since George had been effectively functioning as the head of the household for the past 2 years, his experience would serve him well in planning to sustain himself alone on the farm.
[vii]“Sherman‘s March Through Georgia.” Gale Encyclopedia of U.S. Economic History. Gale Group, 1999. Reproduced in HistoryResourceCenter. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/HistRC/
